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Abstract
An autonomous system is constructed by a manufacturer, operates in a soci-
ety subject to norms and laws, and is interacting with end-users. We address the
challenge of how the moral values and views of all stakeholders can be integrated
and reflected in the moral behaviour of the autonomous system. We propose an ar-
tificial moral agent architecture that uses techniques from normative systems and
formal argumentation to reach moral agreements among stakeholders. We show
how our architecture can be used not only for ethical practical reasoning and col-
laborative decision-making, but also for the explanation of such moral behavior.
Introduction
Artificial autonomous systems depend on human intervention to distinguish moral from
immoral behaviour. Explicitly ethical agents (Moor, 2006) or agents with functional
morality (Wallach and Allen, 2008, Chapter 2) are able to make moral judgements, but
who decides which moral values and principles such artificial agents should be taught?
There are several candidates to teach agents aspects of morality. A governmental
regulator can determine which behaviour is legal with respect to the society in which
the agent is operating. Manufacturers and designers are concerned with issues of liabil-
ity, and with the image and values they stand for. The persons directly interacting with
the autonomous system should be able to choose some aspects of its moral behaviour.
Instead of choosing one of these candidates, we want to combine concerns of all these
stakeholders into a coherent system of values, norms and principles that an artificial
agent can use.
If we are building an implicit ethical agent, in the sense of Moor (2006), then we
can manually, albeit perhaps painstakingly, put together the different concerns from
the stakeholders and construct a single ethical theory. However, sometimes an explicit
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ethical agent needs to be built that uses its autonomy to make moral decisions (Dyrkol-
botn, Pedersen, and Slavkovik, 2018). In that case, the off-line composition of moral-
ities is impossible, and it raises the research question of this paper: How should an
autonomous system dynamically combine the moral values and ethical theories of var-
ious stakeholders?
Let us imagine that each of the “morality” stakeholders are represented with an
“avatar” agent within an autonomous intelligent system governed by an artificial moral
agent. These “avatars” are the “moral council” of the system, like Jiminy Cricket is to
Pinokkio. An artificial moral agent makes a decision by choosing from a set of available
actions and first needs to identify whether an ethical option among these actions exists.
If there is at least one action for which the stakeholders anonymously agree that is
ethical, then this is the action the system should take. If however, all of the available
actions are unethical, or there is no unanimity on the valuation of the actions, then the
“morality council” needs to come up with a direction of what action to choose. To do
this, the recommendations of the “morality council” need to be combined.
The challenge of building the “moral council” is that the stakeholders may not be
following the same ethical reasoning theory. It is not enough that each of the stake-
holders agents chime in with “yes” or “no” when the morality of an action is presented.
We do not want to evaluate the morality of an action by a majority-poll, or always
put the law above the image of the manufacturer, or the personal input of the end-user
above the guidelines of regulatory bodies. Instead, we wish to have an engine that is
able to take inputs from the different stakeholders and bring them into an agreement.
Furthermore, this should be done in such a way so that the artificial moral agent is able
to explain its choice of action (Anderson and Leigh Anderson, 2014) or that choice
should be formally verifiable (Dennis, Fisher, and Winfield, 2015).
We propose that normative systems (Chopra et al., 2018) and formal argumentation
(Baroni et al., 2018) can be used for the task of implementing a “moral council” for an
artificial moral agent. Using this approach we can abstract away from how a particular
decision concerning the morality of an action is reached by a particular stakeholder.
We model each stakeholder as a source of arguments. An argument can be a statement
of whether an action is moral, or a reason why a particular action should be consid-
ered (i)moral. Abstract argumentation allows us to build a system of arguments at-
tacking and supporting each other that can be analysed to determine which statements
supported and which are refuted in the system at a given time. This system can also
generate explanations of decisions using dialogue techniques.
Artificial Moral Agent (AMA) Architecture
In this section we introduce an architecture for an artificial moral agent (or briefly,
AMA), motivated by the following smart home example from https://imdb.uib.
no/dilemmaz/articles/all (Pires Bjørgen et al., 2018). In the running exam-
ple, the AMA is a family home with internal cameras. It has an air conditioning system
and it regularly checks air quality and makes sure there are no risks of carbon monoxide
poisoning or similar in the home. One day the AMA detects clear signs of the smokable
drug, marijuana, in one of the teenagers’ room. The system checks against the local le-
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gal system and determines that possession of marijuana is illegal in this jurisdiction.
The smart home has then three choices: Should the house do nothing, alert only the
adults and let them handle the situation or alert the local police as well. The stakehold-
ers in this case are the family owning the house, the manufacturer of the autonomous
system and the legal system of the jurisdiction under which the house falls.
In an AMA, different stakeholders supply different norms associated with some
ethical concerns and values reflecting them. Norms from different stakeholders with
different values may suggest different and conflicting decisions in a specific situation.
To reconcile these differences, a mechanism is needed that can find an agreement and
also, when prompted, offer an explanation to how a specific morally sensitive decisions
has been made.
The architecture of an AMA we propose for the running example can be visualised
in Figure 1. We assume that the AMA has three stakeholders: the family living in
the smart home, the region in which the house is located represented with the laws
governing it and the manufacturer of the smart home.
Figure 1: Artificial Moral Agent (AMA)
In an AMA, the first important component is a set of normative systems correspond-
ing to the different stakeholders. A normative system describes how actions in a system
of agents can be evaluated and how the behavior of these agents can be guided (Al-
chourron, 1991). A norm is a formal description of a desirable behavior, desirable ac-
tion or a desirable action outcome. Furthermore, normative systems can also be seen as
rule-based systems in which norms can be given with reasons supporting their enforce-
ment. Besides presenting norms, stakeholders can also present standpoints or claims to
affect the decision making of an AMA.
The AMA makes a decision by first determining the state of the world in terms of
a set of perceptions. A decision depends on the state of the world observed and the set
of norms gathered from the three normative systems. Norms are associated with values
to reflect ethical concerns of different stakeholders. Since norms may be in conflict,
an agreement needs to be reached by means of comparing and evaluating arguments
constructed from these norms. Finally, the system gives an explanation concerning why
an action is activated.
The three normative systems, called NS1, NS2 and NS3, respectively represent the
3
family, the manufacturer of the smart home and the legal system associated with the
jurisdiction to which the smart home pertains. Let us assume that the norms and claims
in these normative systems are the norms n1 ∼ n8 and the standpoint a1, where each of
norms is associated with its own set of “values” given in curly brackets. Here, “values”
can be understood as moral “goals” associated to a hierarchical moral value system
which all moral agents possess. We assume that a value system for the AMA is given
and discuss this assumption later in the paper.
NS1 Three norms and a standpoint in the normative system of the family:
n1 :{Healthy} If a child smokes marijuana, then his behavior counts as a bad
behavior. (Parents)
n2 :{Responsibility} If a child has bad behavior then his parents should be
alerted. (Parents)
n3 :{Autonomy} When a child has bad behavior, if his parents have been alerted
then no police should be alerted. (Parents)
a1 : If smoking marijuana is for a medical purpose, then from smoking mari-
juana one can not infer that it is an illegal behavior (i.e., n7 is not applica-
ble). (Child)
NS2 Three norms in the normative system of the manufacturer:
n4 :{Good To Consumers} We should do good to our consumers.
n5 :{Legality} We should obey the law.
n6 :{Protect Privacy} If we want to do good to our consumers, we should not
report their actions to the police unless it is legally required to do so.
NS3 Two (related) norms in the normative system of the law:
n7 :{Healthy, Legality} If a minor smokes marijuana, his behavior counts as
an illegal behavior.
n8 :{Legality} If there is an illegal behavior, then a police should be alerted.
Besides sets of norms and standpoints from different stakeholders, there are some
observations dynamically obtained by sensors, e.g., “a child is smoking marijuana”,
“the child’s smoking is for recreational purpose”, etc. In addition, in the knowledge
base, there are some beliefs, e.g., “if an observation shows that smoking marijuana is
for recreation, then normally it is for recreational purpose”.
Argumentation-based reasoning engine
In this section we focus on how to balance conflicting claims from different stake-
holders and to explain the decisions that have been made. We introduce a formal
argumentation-based approach.
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Abstract argumentation framework
An abstract argumentation framework (AAF) is a graph F = (A,R), where A is a set
of arguments and R ⊆ A×A a set of attacks. Intuitively an argument is a conclusion
supported by a set of premises with some specific logical structure. By using the sets
of norms, the set of observations and the set of beliefs in the knowledge base, we may
construct an AAF as visualized in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Smart-home argumentation example. The text in each blue rectangle is the
claim of a norm, while the text in each gray rectangle is either an observation or a
proposition of a belief. Each solid arrow denotes a support relation, of which the la-
bel indicates that it’s a norm or a belief. Each dotted arrow is an attack, which can
be rebutting, undercutting, or undermining. The capital letters A,B,C,D,E indicate
arguments.
Formal argumentation is a nonmonotonic formalism for reasoning in the context
of disagreement. For example, the normative system of the parents implies the norm
that “the smart-home should call the parents and should not call the police”, but on
the other hand the legal normative system implies the norm “the smart-home should
call the police.” In this sense, formal argumentation is different from classical logic,
and more similar to para-consistent logic. This kind of conflict is called rebut in formal
argumentation, because two conclusions of arguments are in conflict with each other.
There are also other kinds of conflicts between arguments. For example, in argu-
mentD, assume that “for medical purpose” is not a fact but an assumption. Then, it can
be attacked by an observation showing that it is not the case. This kind of attacks are
called undermining in formal argumentation. Moreover, argument D neither conflicts
with the observation “a child is smoking marijuana” nor with the claim “the child’s
smoking is illegal” of the argumentB. Instead, it breaks the relation between these two
statements, saying that the norm n7 is not applicable. This is called undercutting in
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formal argumentation.
Structured argumentation containing arguments and the relations among them can
be represented by natural language or formal languages. In the literature there are sev-
eral formalisms for structured argumentation, e.g., ASPIC+, DeLP, ABA, and classical
argumentation. In this paper, we focus on addressing the issues of agreement reach-
ing and explainability and to do this it is sufficient to remain at the level of abstract
argumentation.
In our running example, we may construct the following five arguments, in which
some sub-arguments are not explicitly represented.
- A (from NS1, parents) Should not alert the police, since a child smoking marijuana
counts as a bad behavior (to promote “Healthy”), and if a child has bad behavior
then his parents should be alerted (to implement “Responsibility”), and if the par-
ents are alerted then the police should not be alerted (to promote “Autonomy”).
- B (from NS3) The police should be alerted, since a child smoking marijuana counts
as an illegal behavior (to promote “Healthy” and “Legality”), and if there is an
illegal behavior then the police should be alerted (to implement “Legality”).
- C (from NS2) Should not alert the police, since we should do good to consumers (to
promote “Good To Consumers”), and if we want to do good to our consumers
then we should not alert the police unless it is explicitly illegal to not do so (to
implement ‘Protect Privacy”).
- D (from NS1, child) For a medical purpose, from smoking marijuana one should
not infer that one exhibits illegal behavior.
- E (from background knowledge) The child’s smoking is for recreational purpose,
since an observation shows that it is not for a medical purpose.
In our system we distinguish two types of arguments: practical arguments and epis-
temic arguments. The practical arguments are reasoning about norms and are associated
with sets of values, while the epistemic arguments are reasoning about the state of the
world without associating values. An AAF corresponding to the smart home argumen-
tation in Figure 2 can be visualized in Figure 3.
When an AAF is enriched with values, it is usually called a value-based argumenta-
tion (VBA), e.g., in Bench-Capon, Atkinson, and Chorley (2005). In the setting of this
paper, a new version of VBA is defined as FV = (Ap,Ae,R, Ag, V, val, pi), where
Ap is a set of practical arguments constructed from norms and associated with val-
ues,Ae is a set of epistemic arguments constructed from observations and standpoints,
R ⊆ (Ap×Ap)∪(Ae×Ae)∪(Ap×Ae) is a set of attacks between arguments,Ag is a
set of agents representing different stakeholders, V is a set of values, val : Ap → 2V is
a function mapping each practical argument to a set of values, and pi : Ae ∪Ap → 2Ag
is a function mapping each argument to a set of agents. When the associated values and
agents are not considered, a VBA is reduced to an AAF F = (Ap ∪ Ae,R).
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Figure 3: Abstract argumentation framework corresponding to the smart home argu-
mentation in Figure 2, in which each practical argument is associated with a set of
agents who contribute to the argument and a set of values involved, while each epis-
temic argument is associated with a set of agents who contribute to the argument.
Agreements by argumentation
Abstract argumentation provides a general mechanism for agreement reaching. In terms
of argumentation, a decision can be understood as accepting or rejecting a set of argu-
ments by considering the interaction among arguments and the values associated to
them.
Given a VBA FV = (Ap,Ae,R, Ag, V, val, pi), when no values are consider, the
acceptance of arguments can be evaluated in an AAF F = (Ap ∪ Ae,R). In terms of
formal argumentation (Dung, 1995), a set of arguments that can be accepted together
is called an extension. There are different types of extensions, which can be defined on
the basis of two important notions: conflict-freeness and defence. Let A = Ap ∪ Ae.
Given a set E ⊆ A, we say that E is conflict-free iff there exist no A,B ∈ E such that
A attacks B. E defends an argument A ∈ A iff for every argument B ∈ A if B attacks
A then there exists C ∈ E such that C attacks B. Then, we say that E is admissible
iff it is conflict-free and defends each argument in E ; E is a complete extension iff E is
admissible and each argument in A defended by E is in E ; E is a preferred extension
iff E is a maximal complete extension with respect to set-inclusion; E is a grounded
extension iff E is a minimal complete extension with respect to set-inclusion.
When the AAFF has more than one extension, we need to decide which one should
be selected. Since values are degrees of importance of some things or actions, one may
argue that a reasonable solution is to accept the one that reaches the maximal extent of
agreement over a set of values. We define this new notion as follows.
For an extension E ⊆ A associated with a set of value VE = ∪A∈E∩Apval(A),
we say that it reaches the maximal extent of agreement over V iff there is no another
extension E ′ ⊆ A associated with a set of values VE′ = ∪A∈E′∩Apval(A) and VE′
has a higher priority over VE , denoted as VE′  VE . We call this approach value-based
optimization. Here, the priority relation between two sets of values can be defined in
term of a partial ordering over V and a lifting principle, e.g., the elitist principle or the
democratic principle Modgil and Prakken (2013). Given a partial ordering over V by
using v1 ≥ v2 to denote v1 is at least as good as v2, and two sets V1 ⊆ V and V2 ⊆ V ,
the elitist principle can be defined as: V1 Eli V2 iff there exists v ∈ V2 such that
v′ ≥ v for all v′ ∈ V1 . The democratic principle can be defined as: V1 Dem V2 iff
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for all v ∈ V2 there exists a v′ ∈ V1 such that v′ ≥ v.
Based on the above notions, the agreement reaching can be realized in two steps.
First, compute the set of extensions in a reduced AAF F = (Ap ∪ Ae,R). Second,
choose a subset of extensions that maximize the extent of agreement over V .
For the purposes of the argumentation-based reasoning engine, we want an agree-
ment among the stakeholders that maximizes the extent of agreement, namely that
maximizes each set of accepted arguments. From this aspect, the preferred extension
perfectly meet this requirement, while some other types of extensions might not. This
is because in some complete extensions, some credulously acceptable arguments are
not included. Here, by saying an argument is credulously acceptable, we mean that it
is in at least one extension, but not in all extensions of an AAF.
Since each AAF has a nonempty set of preferred extensions, and both the relations
Dem and Eli are partial orders, it holds that for each AAF, there exists at least one
preferred extension that maximizes the extent of agreement over a set of values.
Consider the running example again. Let vl ≥ vr ≥ vp ≥ va ≥ vg ≥ vh be
a partial ordering over the set of values in the VBA in Figure 3. We assume that this
ordering is provided according to a given value system. Then, the reduced AAF has two
preferred extensions E1 = {B,E} and E2 = {A,C,E}. We have that E1 maximizes
the extent of agreement over the set of values by using both the democratic and elitist
principles, while E2 maximizes the extent of agreement over the set of values by using
the elitist principle.
From this example, we may observe that to maximize the extent of agreement,
we need to consider the ordering over values and the principle for lifting ordering.
Formal argumentation provides a good way for composing these different factors to
reach an agreement. There could be another types of agreement. For instance, we may
also consider the number, and the degrees of importance, of different stakeholders. We
leave this for future exploitation.
Explainability of agreements
When an AMA makes a decision, it is desirable that it can explain why an action is se-
lected or not. Recently, methodologies, properties and approaches for explanations in
artificial intelligence have been widely studied (Biran and Cotton, 2017). As presented
in Miller (2017), explanations are contrastive since people do not ask why event P
happened, but rather why event P happened instead of some event Q, and social in the
sense that explanations are a transfer of knowledge, presented as part of a conversation
or interaction. It is interesting to note that both contrastive and social aspects of ex-
planations can be implemented by exploiting argumentation. For the former, different
options can be compared and evaluated in an AAF, while for the latter argument-based
dialogues can be used to formalize the process of explanations (Walton, 2011; Cˇyras,
Satoh, and Toni, 2016; Cocarascu, Cˇyras, and Toni, 2018).
To explain why and how a decision is made, one needs to first identify an argument
whose conclusion is the decision. Next, in a dialogical graph corresponding to the AAF
where the argument is located, state that the argument can be accepted because all of
its attackers are rejected, which is in turn because at least one of the attacker of each
attacker is accepted, and so on. In the context of this paper, whether a decision is taken
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depends not only on the interaction between arguments, but also on the maximization
of the extent of agreement over a set of values or a set of stakeholders. To further
improve the explanation we need to provide the other candidate sets, the non-maximal
ones and contrats them with the set supporting the made decision.
Consider the running example again. Assume that for agreement reaching, one
chooses to maximize the extent of agreement over the set of values by using the demo-
cratic principle. In this case, we say that action “The police should be alerted” is se-
lected, because:
Derivability “The police should be alerted” is a conclusion of an argument B, which
can be derived from an observation “a child smokes marijuana” and two norms
“if a child smokes marijuana, their behavior counts as an illegal behavior” and
“if there is an illegal behavior then the police should be alerted”.
Agreement reaching The extension E1 = {B,E} which contains the argument B is
selected since E1 maximizes the extent of agreement over the set of values by
using democratic principle.
Justification in a dialogue graph Argument B is accepted with respect to E1, be-
cause all its attackers are rejected:
- argument A is rejected because its attacker B is accepted.
- argument C is rejected because its attacker B is accepted.
- argumentD is rejected because its attacker E is accepted.
The above dialogue can be represented as a dialogue game or a discussion game.
Readers may refer to Vreeswijk and Prakken (2000); Booth, Caminada, and Marshall
(2018) for details.
Assumptions and evaluation
In this section we outline the assumptions that should be satisfied for the Artificial
Moral Agent (AMA) Architecture to be feasible. This can be used both for the evalua-
tion, as well for guiding further research relaxing the assumptions.
Before anything we should clarify where the values and their order of priority for
an AMA come from. There are numerous moral values that can be specified and moral
philosophy shows there is no such thing as an absolute exhaustive set of values, norms
and/or moral principles. Although the AMA may operate in varying different contexts,
the set of its actions, level of autonomy and criticality of the system are known by de-
sign. E.g., a smart home cannot detect smoke if it is not equipped with smoke sensors.
The International Society of Automotive Engineers (2016) distinguishes between five
categories of vehicles based on their level of required supervision of a driver. While
an airplane autopilot operates a critical system, a smart home does not have access to
features that can kill hundreds of people when they malfunction. How critical a sys-
tem is in particular impacts the order of values the connected AMA should heed - for
example, in a non-critical system a user can be free to set the value order. With the
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development of autonomous systems it is reasonable to expect that a characterization
of relevant values and priorities over them will be made available by the relevant certi-
fication authorities when the system housing an AMA is approved for market.
In addition to this assumption of value (order) origin, we analyze the assumptions
made on the stakeholders, the argumentation-based engine and the overall knowledge-
based representation.
Knowledge-based representation. An autonomous system such as a smart home
is equipped with sensors based on which the AMA associated with this system is able
to establish the state of the world and build a knowledge-base used in its reasoning. We
assume that the AMA has an ontology of propositions, actions and moral values and it
is able to transform sensor data into parts of the ontology. This is a known problem of
information engineering, see e.g. Ziafati (2015) for an overview of the state of the art.
Stakeholder assumptions. It is clear that stakeholders cannot have a human repre-
sentative available for each automated system that exists in the market so an artificial
agent to acts as an avatar for the stakeholder needs to be constructed. This artificial
avatar agent needs to be able to pose arguments during decision-making.
It is reasonable to expect that each stakeholder can, at deployment, identify a set of
values that they would uphold, and that these values will not change through the life
time of the AMA. In contrast, the arguments used in a decision-making are context-
dependent and cannot all be specified at deployment but must be dynamically con-
structed. Automated argument extraction is a very new field concerned with how ar-
guments can be identified in natural language (Walton, 2012; Sergeant, 2013). While
identifying arguments is not the same as constructing them during argumentation, this
method can be used to enable an avatar to represent a stakeholder in a “discussion”.
Laws are already specified in natural language, whereas manufacturers and users will
have to be tasked to explicitly write a document that expresses the normative systems
they would like to represent them. It is an open problem to characterize the form of this
document.
Argumentation-based engine assumptions The AMA itself, based on its under-
lying argumentation framework definition, needs to be able to identify the state of the
world, evaluate arguments, identify argument relations, align arguments with values,
and compare values. An approach to this is to construct the agent’s ontology in such a
way that it is able to express whether two arguments or values are in conflict or not.
Related work
It is not clear whether an artificial agent can ever be a moral agent categorically as
people are (Moor, 2006; Etzioni and Etzioni, 2017). It is however, clear that some
level of moral behaviour can be implemented in machines. Wallach and Allen (2008)
distinguish between operational morality, functional morality, and full moral agency.
Moor (2006) distinguishes between ethical impact agents, explicit, implicit and full
moral agency, see also Dyrkolbotn, Pedersen, and Slavkovik (2018). Some proposals
and prototypes on how to implement moral agency are already being put forwards like
Anderson and Leigh Anderson (2014); Arkin, Ulam, and Wagner (2012); Bringsjord,
Arkoudas, and Bello (2008); Vanderelst and Winfield (2017); Dennis et al. (2016);
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Lindner and Bentzen (2017).
It has been shown that people consider that the same ideas of morality do not pertain
both to people and to machines (Malle et al., 2015). It is argued in Charisi et al. (2017),
that the complex issue of where machine morality comes from should be considered
from the aspect of all stakeholders - all persons who in some way are impacted by the
behaviour of and decisions made by an autonomous system. They distinguish between
government and societal regulatory bodies on one end, manufacturers and designers
on the other, and end-users, customers and owners on the third. Noted that these broad
categories of stakeholders can further be subdivided, for example one can distinguish
between owners and “leasers” of the autonomous system1.
While it has been argued in the literature that an autonomous system should be
built to integrate moral, societal and legal values , see for example Dignum (2017);
Charisi et al. (2017), to the best of our knowledge no approach has been proposed as
how to accomplish this. This is the first work that explicitly considers the problem of
integrating the moral values of multiple stakeholders in the artificial moral agent.
The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), specifically, the GDPR (Sec-
tions 13-15) gives users affected by automated decision-making a right to obtain “mean-
ingful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envis-
aged consequences of such processing for the data subject”. One way to obtain this
is by building systems capable to give arguments supporting the decisions they make.
Our approach provides for this.
Explainability has not been considered a critical feature in logic based systems,
e.g., Dennis et al. (2016); Lindner and Bentzen (2017); Bringsjord, Arkoudas, and
Bello (2008), since here one can use formal methods to prove what behaviour of an au-
tonomous systems is possible in which contexts. We argue however that a formal proof,
while “accessible” to a regulatory body is not sufficient to constitute explainability to
common people. The GenEth system of Anderson and Leigh Anderson (2014) uses
input from professional ethicists and machine learning to create a principle of ethical
action preference. GenEth can “explain” its decisions by stating how two options were
compared and what were the ethical features of each.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed an argumentation-based architecture for moral agents
as social agents, in the sense that the moral agents take also the practical reasoning
of other agents into account. In particular, the moral agent combines normative sys-
tems of several stakeholders towards reaching an ethical decision. In other words, we
enrich the decision making of the ethical autonomous agent by collaborative decision-
making of the stakeholders. Whereas other existing architectures of social agents only
take the goals or utilities of other agents into account, our moral agent is social in
the stronger sense of including concepts and techniques from collective reasoning like
norms, argumentation and agreement. Likewise other collective reasoning techniques
1https://robohub.org/should-a-carebot-bring-an-alcoholic-a-drink-poll-says-it-depends-on-who-owns-
the-robot/
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can be adopted from game theory or the theory of negotiation. The agent architecture
gives also explanations for moral decisions in terms of justification and dialogue.
A key distinguishing feature of our architecture is that the stakeholders can adopt
distinct ethical theories. The ethical reasoning is therefore not hardwired into the sys-
tem, but represented by the normative theories the stakeholders adopt. In addition, as
usual the stakeholders can adopt distinct ethical values. So, even if two stakeholders
agree on the ethical theories they adopt, they can still have conflicting arguments due
to differences in the values they adopt.
We also discuss the assumptions and limitations of the AMA architecture. In future
work we will make the architecture more widely applicable by relaxing the assumptions
of the model, in particular by introducing learning techniques and introducing recur-
sive modeling of stakeholders by other stakeholders. We will develop a user-guide and
methodology to define the ontology, normative theories and knowledge base. We will
integrate other components such as machine learning, neural networks, Bayesian rea-
soning, causal reasoning, or goal oriented (or BDI) reasoning into the architecture. In
addition we will model more examples and develop realistic case studies to drive the
development of our architecture. Finally, we will develop standards for the ontology
and study how to integrate the architecture with the IEEE 1471-2000 standard.
Two challenges for future research stand out. The first challenge is how to decide
on the preference ordering on the ethical values in the system that are here assumed as
given. As conflicts among the arguments of the stakeholders may be based on conflicts
among their ethical values, another layer of argumentation may be needed to decide the
preferences among them. The second challenge is how to ensure that all stakeholders
are treated fairly. For example, if first the manufacturer and the legal system have to
introduce their normative systems, and only thereafter the user can introduce its nor-
mative system knowing the other normative systems, then the user may have an unfair
advantage. To study this kind of fairness, techniques from social choice theory may be
useful.
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